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Abstract Threats to health from climate change are increasingly recognized, yet little research into the
eﬀects upon health systems is published. However, additional demands on health systems are increas-
ingly documented. Pathways include direct weather impacts, such as ampliﬁed heat stress, and altered
ecological relationships, including alterations to the distribution and activity of pathogens and vectors.
The greatest driver of demand on future health systems from climate change may be the alterations to
socioeconomic systems; however, these “tertiary eﬀects” have received less attention in the health liter-
ature. Increasing demands on health systems from climate change will impede health system capacity.
Changing weather patterns and sea-level rise will reduce food production in many developing countries,
thus fostering undernutrition and concomitant disease susceptibility. Associated poverty will impede
people’s ability to access and support health systems. Climate change will increase migration, potentially
exposing migrants to endemic diseases for which they have limited resistance, transporting diseases and
fostering conditions conducive to disease transmission. Speciﬁc predictions of timing and locations of
migration remain elusive, hampering planning and misaligning needs and infrastructure. Food shortages,
migration, falling economic activity, and failing government legitimacy following climate change are also
“risk multipliers” for conﬂict. Injuries to combatants, undernutrition, and increased infectious disease will
result. Modern conﬂict often sees health personnel and infrastructure deliberately targeted and disease
surveillance and eradication programs obstructed. Climate change will substantially impede economic
growth, reducing health system funding and limiting health system adaptation. Modern medical care may
be snatched away frommillions who recently obtained it.
1. Introduction
Threats to human health from climate change are receiving increased attention, with some arguing that
climate change is the greatest risk to global health in the 21st century [Costello et al., 2009]. As might be
expected for such a new and interdisciplinary enterprise, initial research into health hazards from climate
change has concentrated on a few areas, whereas others have been left under-investigated [Butler and
Harley, 2010]. One classiﬁcation of the health eﬀects [Butler, 2014] of climate change deﬁnes “primary”
eﬀects as those that operate directly on the human organism [Butler and Harley, 2010], such as heat stress
and trauma from exposure to severe weather events. Such eﬀects are increasingly recognized and under-
stood [Luber and McGeehin, 2008; Kjellstrom et al., 2009].
In this classiﬁcation, secondary eﬀects act less directly, via ecosystem alteration and other interactions,
including changes in the distribution and prevalence of diseases and vectors [Patz and Olson, 2006; Zhou
et al., 2008; Chaves and Koenraadt, 2010; Gething et al., 2010]. However, “tertiary” health eﬀects—those
mediated through impacts on social, political, and economic systems—will likely have the greatest long-
term impact on human health. This possibility remains relatively underexplored and scarcely recognized
[Butler and Harley, 2010]. Its manifestations include heightened risk of conﬂict [Mazo, 2010; Hsiang et al.,
2011], increased migration [McMichael et al., 2012], and growing pressures on food production systems
and thus food security [Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007; Butler, 2010].
Despite this range of potential and existing health risks, there has been little analysis of how health sys-
tems will be impacted by climate change. Here we assess the literature to determine likely eﬀects of cli-
mate change on health systems in the coming decades. We follow the World Health Organization’s def-
inition of a health system as consisting “of all organizations, people and actions whose primary intent
is to promote, restore or maintain health” [World Health Organization, 2007]. Our analytic framework is
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twofold: we examine the impacts of climate change on the demands placed on health systems, and on the
capacity of health systems to meet these demands. Analysis suggests that primary and secondary eﬀects
of climate change could aﬀect human health in many ways, increasing pressure on health systems, but are
unlikely to substantially alter health system capacity. However, the tertiary eﬀects of climate change could
both substantially impair human health and undermine capacity.
2. Primary and SecondaryHealth Eﬀects
As mentioned earlier, the primary and secondary health eﬀects of climate change have to date received
the most attention. Various causal pathways that harm health and increase health system demand are
documented. For example, several noncommunicable diseases, including cardiovascular and kidney dis-
eases, will be exacerbated by increased occupational heat exposure [Kjellstrom et al., 2010; Tawatsupa
et al., 2012], and increased temperature from climate change will increase morbidity and mortality [Bi
et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2011]. Climate change may be contributing to the global rise in asthma, includ-
ing via increased air pollution and respiratory allergies [D’amato and Cecchi, 2008; Ziska and Beggs, 2012].
More frequent and intense extreme weather events and bushﬁres pose additional risks to air quality and
thus to a range of chronic diseases including cardiovascular diseases.
Ecological disruptions from climate change will further impact health. Vector-borne diseases will likely
expand their distribution with climate change, owing to changes in humidity, temperature, and vegeta-
tion, which can impact both vector and pathogen life cycles. Diseases expected to be worsened include
malaria [Chaves and Koenraadt, 2010], dengue [van Kleef et al., 2011], and some tick-borne diseases,
although other factors such as governance substantially inﬂuence infectious disease dynamics. Food- and
water-borne diseases, including those caused by salmonella and campylobacter, may also increase owing
to climate change [Semenza et al., 2011].
3. Hunger
Hunger and undernutrition may increase substantially following climate change [Schmidhuber and
Tubiello, 2007; Butler, 2010]. Some analysts are more conﬁdent about global food production for at least
the medium term, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, 2007]. Food security is commonly deﬁned as comprising food availability, stability, access,
and utilization. The predictions of agricultural food production to 2050 vary, but worsen as this century
unfolds, unless there is substantial mitigation. Agricultural production has long been predicted to shift
from lower to higher latitude areas [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007; Schmidhuber and
Tubiello, 2007]. However, some projected increases in productivity at higher latitudes may be constrained
by water availability [Tao et al., 2011], whereas the poor quality of soil at higher latitudes has long been
recognized as a major constraint, as is the relative lack of sunlight for many months [Butler, 2010]. Ocean
acidiﬁcation due to carbon dioxide absorption is likely to reduce aquatic food availability to humans.
The altered chemistry interferes with the shell creation of corals and other species. Acting alone, this
could kill most of the world’s highly food-productive coral reefs, many of which are already harmed by
overﬁshing and other forms of pollution. This will be disastrous for the hundreds of millions of the world’s
poor who rely on coral reef ecosystems for food [Bradbury, 2012]. Acidiﬁcation also interferes directly with
the development of commercially important ﬁsh and molluscs [Cooley and Doney, 2009; Baumann et al.,
2012].
Destabilizing weather patterns and increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events also
appear likely to lower the stability of food supplies, particularly aﬀecting the poor population [Schmidhu-
ber and Tubiello, 2007] such as landless agricultural laborers and subsistence farmers. Rising food prices
may be of limited beneﬁt to small farmers who often lack market power, organization, and the capacity
to properly store food for sale when prices go even higher. Domestic political pressure, in conjunction
with low harvests, is likely to cause some governments to limit food exports, as occurred with some grain
exporters between 2007 and 2010 [Cribb, 2010]. This phenomenon would further diminish global food
stability, and thus nutrition, by disrupting the free ﬂow of trade. The eﬀects might be most keenly felt in
countries that are net food importers, and also by the poor in many developed countries. However, food
insecurity would increase even in countries that were normally net food exporters. In the current global
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system, many risks associated with time-limited, localized disruption to food production are eliminated
by the smoothing function of long-distance trade. A self-reinforcing spiral of export bans is a major risk
following climate change.
Climate change will limit access to food for individuals, communities, and countries. Increased purchasing
power relative to food prices has underpinned much of the reduction of hunger in percentage terms, as
reported in recent decades. Climate change may also interact with other limits to growth to slow down
economic growth, especially in many areas already beset by poverty, further hampering food access
[Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007; McMichael et al., 2014]. Diminished health due to climate change con-
ditions, including transmissible diseases, will further impede access to food for the poor. Food utilization
may also be diminished by increased spoilage and contamination in a hotter climate [Schmidhuber and
Tubiello, 2007; Butler, 2010].
Increased hunger will amplify health system burden directly through increased presentation of undernu-
trition, which impairs immunity and can also predispose to diabetes and other chronic diseases in later
life, some of which are also associated with immune dysfunction. Decreased food security also under-
mines other determinants of health, as people make trade-oﬀs to ensure calorie intake, but often at the
expense of micronutrients. Other examples include children foregoing education for work and people
with limited choice engaging in unsafe employment, including the sex trade. Poverty associated with food
insecurity decreases the ability of populations to support their health systems, not only economically but
because of the “brain drain” that constantly reduces number of skilled personnel in impoverished areas
that are also often physically insecure.
4.Migration
Climate change is increasingly recognized as a major factor for increased migration, as people seek to
adapt to altering conditions [McLeman and Smit, 2006; Black et al., 2011b;White, 2011]. The decision to
migrate involves multiple forces. Push and pull are well recognized, but “glue” and “fend” are increasingly
important [Bowles et al., 2014]. Push factors weigh in favor of relocation. Climatic reduction of agricul-
tural productivity will likely be a push factor in many regions. Accompanying degradation of sociopolitical
conditions may come as a more forceful push, should ethnic tensions or violence result. Over half of the
world’s refugees are from just ﬁve countries, all beset by conﬂict: Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, and
Sudan [UNHCR, 2013]. The civil war in Syria, to which climate change may have contributed [Femia and
Werrell, 2013], has already created over 2 million refugees.
Glue, in contrast, describes the attachments that people have with their current location, often the ances-
tral home, which weigh against migration. In some areas, ecological disruption will weaken the emotional
and economic ties that people have with their places and ecosystems, including for those living within
traditional and other cultures making their living directly from the land. Social disruptions from climate
change may further weaken these emotional attachments, as once familiar areas change their nature, a
form of solastalgia.
Natural and social deterrents that limit or seek to restrict in-migration can be called “fend” factors. As pop-
ulation growth, climate change, and other environmental changes interact to increase migration ﬂows,
xenophobia seems likely to increase in many receiving areas. Some nations already have policies to deter
migration, such as in the case of African migrants to Europe and asylum seekers to Australia, which now
seeks to redirect refugees arriving by boat to nearby developing nations such as Papua New Guinea. Such
practices are likely to increase with climate change [Welzer, 2012]. These fend policies may be intensiﬁed
by degrees of social and economic exclusion of arrivals.
The perceived beneﬁts of a potential destination exert a pull; apparent advantages may correspond to
the actual beneﬁts of a place more or less closely. At least initially, developed countries appear likely to be
more insulated from the eﬀects of climate change than developing countries because of more diversiﬁed
economies, enhanced adaptive capacity, and less negative eﬀects on local agriculture in high latitudes.
Diﬀerential impacts of climate change will create a strong pull toward some areas. But high-income coun-
tries are not entirely immune. In the United States, the population of New Orleans is still lower than before
Hurricane Katrina, an extreme event worsened not only by wetland clearances but probably also by cli-
mate change, including sea-level rise.
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Climate change can substantially alter these four factors, directly and indirectly. Alternative causal classi-
ﬁcations exist, demonstrating the complex pathways that determine migration decisions. For example,
Black et al. identify ﬁve types of migration drivers, environmental, political, social, demographic, and
economic, noting that environmental change interacts with the other four types of drivers [Black et al.,
2011a]. The multiplicity of factors underpinning migration makes the monocausal identiﬁcation of
“climate migrants” almost impossible, but does not mean that climate change is not an important factor
in many migration decisions [Piguet et al., 2011].
The multiple analytical frameworks, diﬃculties inherent in identifying climate migrants, and diﬀerent
scenarios for predicting how people will react to climate change have hampered agreement about the
methodology for predicting the scale of future impact. Unsurprisingly, projections diﬀer substantially,
but tend to agree that the number of climate migrants will be in the tens or hundreds of millions by 2050
[Gemenne, 2011], with one of the most robust assessments predicting around 200 million or more [Bier-
mann and Boas, 2010].
Migration increased by climate change is likely to directly aﬀect health in multiple ways [Afolayan and
Adelekan, 1999; Barbieri and Confalonieri, 2011;McMichael et al., 2012]. Migrants may be exposed to new
diseases for which they have little or no genetic resistance or cultural experience [Afolayan and Adelekan,
1999]. The spread of disease may be enabled or hastened by migration [Barbieri and Confalonieri, 2011].
Much climate migration will be rural to urban, within and between developing countries [Piguet et al.,
2011; Black et al., 2011b], and could lead to overcrowded and unsanitary conditions conducive to ill-health
[Locke, 2009].
Climate migration will likely hinder health system planning and implementation. The future scale of cli-
mate migration remains hotly contested, with vastly diﬀerent estimates of even current levels of envi-
ronmental migration [Gemenne, 2011]. Little research into likely destinations of future climate migrants
has occurred [Findlay, 2011]. Increased xenophobia and sociopolitical fend factors, including changes in
migration policies, are to some extent unpredictable; this hinders accurate forecasting of likely destina-
tions. Research funding biased toward impacts on developed countries could further impede prediction
for developing countries, although small budgets and limited bureaucratic systems could preclude eﬀec-
tive adaptation in any case. Climate change, in combination with other limits to growth and a rising global
population, may accelerate our nascent “fortress world” where enclaves of privilege exist in a global con-
text of widespread poverty and system breakdown [Raskin et al., 2002]. Such uncertainty increases the
challenge of matching future health system resources to need, particularly given the long lead time to
train and place health staﬀ and build health infrastructure.
5. Conﬂict
Links between climate change and an increased risk of conﬂict are widely reported in the academic lit-
erature [Cook, 2011; Hsiang et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011;Welzer, 2012; Hsiang et al., 2013], and within
defense communities [Sullivan et al., 2007; Department of Defense, 2010; Jarvis et al., 2011;Morisetti, 2012].
Hsiang et al. recently published a meta-analysis of 60 studies on conﬂict [Hsiang et al., 2013]. The stud-
ies included cover several millennia but focus on the last century. They ﬁnd an increase of 14% in the
frequency of intergroup conﬂict for every standard deviation in change toward warmer temperatures
[Hsiang et al., 2013]. Other analysis shows a correlation between natural climate change, reductions in
food availability, and increased conﬂict in Europe and China between 1500 and 1800 [Zhang et al., 2011].
Between 1950 and 2004, the odds of a civil conﬂict starting in equatorial countries aﬀected by the El Nin˜o
Southern Oscillation were twice as high in drier, hotter El Nin˜o years compared with wetter, cooler La Nin˜a
years [Hsiang et al., 2011]. Decreased economic productivity from climate change in many developing
countries will sap already low tax bases, worsen corruption, impair governance, and reduce opportuni-
ties for peaceful redress of grievances. Decreased and shifting availability of essential resources, including
arable land and food, will heighten frustration and could create cohorts of people with little to lose and
for whom armed conﬂict represents their best chance to secure essential resources.
The contribution of anthropogenic climate change to conﬂict may have already begun. Increased deser-
tiﬁcation and drought, possibly caused by climate change, combined with a number of sociopolitical
factors to contribute to the genocide in Darfur [Mazo, 2010;Welzer, 2012]. Increased grain prices, caused
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partly by reduced harvests owing to climate change, may have contributed to the Arab Spring and the
Syrian civil war [Werrell and Femia, 2013].
Increased conﬂict would elevate health service demand through a number of pathways [Cook, 2011; Jarvis
et al., 2011;Morisetti, 2012] including additional battle casualties, especially if the trend toward targeting
of civilians continues [Welzer, 2012]. In regions with limited economic activity, civilians may be deliberately
targeted. Mass civilian casualties and resulting refugee camps can trigger increased foreign aid, some
of which can be appropriated by warlords [Welzer, 2012]. Conﬂict also facilitates the spread of disease
through migration, sexual violence, malnutrition, psychological trauma, and the creation of unhygienic
conditions [Connolly et al., 2004].
Conﬂict already devastates local health systems. Surveillance for new or re-emergent diseases is often
impeded and disease eradication and vaccination programs can be impaired. Consequences may be
regional or global [Connolly et al., 2004]. Health infrastructure and personnel are targeted in many con-
ﬂicts, including Iraq [Alwan, 2011] and Pakistan [Varley, 2010]. Regardless of the direct losses of health
personnel to violence, many choose to leave conﬂict zones for safety. In Iraq most doctors left their jobs
and half departed the country [Alwan, 2011].
The longer-term consequences of increased conﬂict on health systems could be global. Long-lasting civil
conﬂict would likely decrease economic growth, as whole generations miss out on educational and other
opportunities, with global economic eﬀects. Increased xenophobia and protectionism are other possi-
bilities, and could limit options for potential migrants and minorities. Humanitarian aid is likely to fall,
although military subsidies from developed to developing countries may increase, especially where this is
considered to help secure access to resources.
6. Health SystemFunding
Without adequate mitigation, climate change will substantially impede economic growth [Stern, 2007],
and could lead to dramatically lower standards of living in future. The release of all the methane from
thawing permafrost on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf alone was recently predicted to result in damages
from increased climate change costing about $60 trillion if it occurred, comparable with world eco-
nomic activity in 2012 [Whiteman et al., 2013]. Such costs would fall heavily on the developing world
[Whiteman et al., 2013]. Reduced economic activity could restrict funding for health systems from all
sources, including governments and private users.
Without mitigation, increased competition for government and philanthropic funding may further limit
investments in the health system and in other determinants of health. The economic eﬀects of climate
change in developed countries could decrease foreign aid budgets, potentially increasing refugee pres-
sures [Gulledge, 2008]. Increasingly elaborate eﬀorts to prevent immigration from developing countries
overwhelmed by climate change could divert funds otherwise intended for health or aid. More frequent
or intense conﬂict would boost defense budgets among aﬀected countries. More frequent conﬂict would
cause even countries not directly involved to re-evaluate their threat assessments. One response could
be to further shift funding from health systems and health determinants, including social safety nets and
universal education, to defense projects. This tendency could be especially pronounced where ethnic and
state lines overlap, heightening the risk of conﬂict spill-over, as in much of Africa.
Diminished investment would decrease health research and technical developments, and impede the
translation of research into common practice. Recent trends of expanding access to modern medical care
could be halted or reversed.
7. Discussion
Two major new ﬁndings emerge from this review. First, tertiary eﬀects of climate change will decrease
the capacity of health systems to meet rising demands, generally in ways that reduce health system fund-
ing, functioning, and ﬂexibility. This ﬁnding augments the now established literature demonstrating that
primary and secondary eﬀects of climate change will increase demands on health systems. The conclu-
sions of this review add weight to the emerging literature on the tertiary eﬀects of climate change on
health, which suggest that they will also increase demands on health systems. Operating via these two
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pathways, tertiary climate change eﬀects appear the class of consequences most important for human
health.
Second, this review suggests that health systems could lose future adaptive capacity. This conclusion
challenges the dominant emphasis on adaptation, rather than mitigation, in response to climate change
[Pielke et al., 2007] and the current energy investment regime that favors unconventional carbon sources
over cleaner fuels [Klare, 2013]. While health systems must struggle to adapt as far as possible to meet ris-
ing demands from climate change, without substantial mitigation their capacity to do so may be feeble,
especially in the medium- and long term.
The speciﬁc risks from anthropogenic climate change outlined in this review—decreased food
security, increased ill health associated with climate-induced migration and conﬂict, and reduced
health system functioning—are probabilistically certain to occur on at least some scale. The climate has
already changed. Rain-fed agriculture is already less viable in parts of the developing world. This has
already fuelled migration and been implicated as a causal factor in several conﬂicts, in turn decreasing the
capacity of local and national health systems. The severity and geographic and temporal extent of these
tertiary eﬀects depends primarily on future greenhouse gas emission scenarios. The manners in which
people and polities react to the altered climate will also aﬀect public health demands and health system
capacity. However, at this stage options will be ecologically constrained by a degraded biosphere less
capable of supporting some human activities. Both of these factors are likely to be shaped by the degree
to which humanity views the tertiary eﬀects of climate change as fundamentally ecological problems
that are shared by humanity. Emphasis on the health eﬀects of climate change may be useful in shifting
public opinion. The public is more willing to decrease its carbon emissions when climate change is framed
as a health issue [Myers et al., 2012]. Raising awareness that health systems are vulnerable to a focus on
adaptation could strengthen public support for preventive action on climate change.
8. Conclusion
Health and health systems face increased demands from the primary, secondary, and tertiary health
eﬀects of climate change. Rising food prices and undernutrition will erode the health of many popula-
tions. Climate change migration, in response to deteriorating conditions, will stress health systems in
receiving countries and cause immense psychological pain, as millions of people are forced to try to ﬁnd
a new home. Increased conﬂict in part caused by climate change will worsen health and further burden
health systems, and may already be occurring.
Simultaneously, health systems and their underpinning socioeconomic bases will also face increasing
pressure from climate change. Decreased economic activity and additional competition for resources,
including for adaptation, defense, and border protection, will likely diminish health system funding
and further impair health system cohesion. The tertiary eﬀects of climate change will likely impede the
adaptive capacity of health systems when they are most needed. Prompt mitigation would substantially
decrease these risks. The world appears to be drifting toward a precipice, which future generations will
descend. Our generation still has the opportunity to lessen this risk, but the time in which to act continues
to diminish.
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